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ABSTRACT
Existing theory suggests that under neo-corporatist governance, civil society groups are less likely to take
the state to court. However, a comparative analysis of the use of legal strategies across a number of
environmental nongovernmental organizations ðENGOsÞ in France presents a counterintuitive ﬁnding.
Drawing on new data on more than 200 cases taken by these ENGOs, the analysis ﬁnds that the groups
that are most incorporated in policy making are also the most active litigants against the Environment
Ministry in the Conseil d’Etat. This article tests a number of theoretical explanations to account for this
result. It ﬁnds that the neo-corporatization of the rules determining access to justice as well as the presence
of certain agent-level characteristics helps to explain when and why groups mobilize the law.
INTRODUCTION
This article addresses an empirical puzzle that stems from the variation in the use of
litigation to pursue social and political goals among environmental nongovernmental
organizations ðENGOsÞ in France since 1975. Existing theory suggests that the relation-
ships that civil society groups have with public authorities can be a key factor in explain-
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ing which groups are willing and able to turn to judicial venues to inﬂuence policy
making and which are not. Scholars who have examined groups’ interactions with
governments have tended to argue that “outsider” groups—that is, those without direct
access to decision makers in other political arenas—have more freedom to litigate than
“insider” groups, which might be wary about threatening good relationships with policy
makers ðCoglianese 1996; Kagan 2001; Morag-Levine 2003; Soennecken 2008Þ. This
is particularly the case where state–civil society relationships are governed by a neo-
corporatist logic. In contrast with pluralist systems of civil society–state interactions,
where interest groups compete for access and inﬂuence in policy making, many western
European states have long been characterized by a different model of governance, one
that values close cooperation between state organs and peak civil society organizations
and where consensus decision making and civil society involvement in policy imple-
mentation are the norm. In these types of neo-corporatist political systems, we would
expect “insider groups” to be particularly reluctant to jeopardize their relationships with
government partners by taking them to court.
In France, however, the data presented here suggest that the opposite logic char-
acterizes legal mobilization activity in the area of environmental policy: groups that are
closest to the government tend to turn to the courts more often. This research shows that
the two civil society associations that have had among the most privileged access to the
Ministry of the Environment in terms of involvement in policy making and receiving
public funding for their work, France Nature Environnement ðFNEÞ and Ligue pour la
Protection des Oiseaux ðLPOÞ, have also regularly taken cases to the Conseil d’Etat—
the highest administrative court in France—which directly challenge the decisions of
the ministry. Why have groups that have privileged access to policy makers turned to the
Conseil d’Etat more than “outsider” groups?
This article tests a number of explanations put forward in the legal mobilization
literature and ﬁnds that the answer to this question is twofold. First, the legal opportunity
structure that shapes who has access to courts in environmental law in France is also
dominated by a neo-corporatist logic that privileges policy “insiders.” Second, this
research suggests that the best explanation for legal mobilization activity may sometimes
lie in the dynamic interaction between the structural features that shape access to the legal
system, on the one hand, and an organization’s structure and internal attitude toward the
law, on the other. This builds on a growing body of work that argues that paying due
attention to the inﬂuence of agent-level characteristics within a particular legal and
political setting can offer better explanations for when and why groups turn to courts
than focusing on external, structural factors alone ðEpstein, Kobylka, and Stewart 1995;
Alter and Vargas 2000; Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam 2010; Vanhala 2011b;
Doherty and Hayes 2014Þ.
The ﬁrst section of the article reviews the literature on how neo-corporatist gover-
nance may inﬂuence the propensity of civil society groups to litigate. The second section
offers an analysis of new empirical data about litigation by French environmental
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associations in the Conseil d’Etat. The third section surveys competing theoretical
explanations for legal mobilization and tests these approaches with evidence from the
French case. The research ﬁnds that a neo-corporatization of the standing rules has
meant that policy insiders are also more likely to mobilize the law. It also suggests that
in this case the presence of legal resources within an organization and a decentralized
organizational structure facilitate legal mobilization. Financial resources, on the other
hand, did not seem to matter as much as previous research has suggested. The article
concludes by offering a consideration of what lessons can be drawn from this research
and suggestions for the direction of future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Political scientists have often traced the turn to the courts by groups “disadvantaged” in
traditional political arenas. Early studies, relying mainly on case studies of the American
civil rights movement, argued that “outsider” groups lacking inﬂuence over members of
the executive, legislative, or regulatory bodies were more likely to turn to the courts to
pursue their policy goals. Early examples of this research ðVose 1959; Cortner 1968Þ
included studies of interest group litigation in housing discrimination cases in the
segregated South throughout the 1950s. This research found that groups lacking access
to the executive and legislative branches of the government consequently seek redress
through the courts. This early research found that groups use litigation as a last resort after
the breakdown in social relationships or the absence of relationships in the ﬁrst place ðsee
also Macaulay 1963; Galanter 1983; Elickson 1991Þ. However, this characterization was
challenged by Olson ð1990Þ, who found that legal and political resources were more
important than exclusion from policy-making processes in explaining the use of litigation
by groups. She showed how the courts can be used by powerful groups to enforce gains
won politically. In a similar vein, Epstein and her coauthors ðe.g., Epstein 1985; Epstein
and Rowland 1991; Epstein et al. 1995Þ have shown that groups might turn to the courts
to provide a counterbalance to competing claims, to act as agenda setters, or to maintain
victories achieved in other policy arenas. Coglianese ð1996Þ found that in relationships
between interest groups and the US Environmental Protection Agency ðEPAÞ, the in-
terest groups with the most extensive, long-standing relationships with the EPA tended to
be the ones most likely to litigate against the agency’s regulations. He found that this type
of litigation in many instances is often just another round of an ongoing process of
bargaining. In short, as a result of this research, the idea that political disadvantage
explains litigation activity by groups in the United States was largely overturned two
decades ago.
The idea has nonetheless reappeared as the study of legal mobilization outside of the
United States has blossomed in the last decade. For those examining legal mobilization
in other jurisdictions, the role of civil society–state relations has reemerged as a key
explanatory factor accounting for the ways in which groups mobilize rights ðor fail toÞ.
This research has helped to nuance the “political disadvantage” thesis. Alter and Vargas
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ð2000, 472Þ found some evidence to suggest that in the use of European litigation
strategies, “the greater the political strength of a group, and the more access the group has
to the policy-making process, the less likely a group is to mount a litigation campaign.”
Soennecken ð2008Þ similarly found that in Germany, groups advocating for the protec-
tion of refugees were unlikely to use the courts because they achieved their goals through
their political relationships.Morag-Levine ð2003Þ argues that the presence of both group-
level partnership-centered relationships and the national culture of state–civil society
cooperation shapes the likelihood of groups bringing political issues to court. Relying on
case studies of conservationist organizations in the United States and Israel, Morag-Levine
found that taking this political relational perspective can help to elucidate why some
campaigners are more tolerant of conﬂict with state institutions and hencemore willing to
litigate against government authorities.
A weakness of the political relationship hypothesis is that its underpinning assump-
tions have largely been based on research on legal mobilization dynamics in the United
States, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, Israel and the United Kingdom ðIsraël 2009Þ. To
varying degrees, these are all states with a pluralist model of interest group–state relation-
ships, and as Epstein et al. write, the very idea of “ ‘interest group litigation’ is steeped in
the pluralist tradition” ð1995, 105Þ. As Morag-Levine ð2003Þ, Soennecken ð2008Þ, and
Anagnostou ð2014Þ convincingly show, the ﬁndings based on these studies may not be
pertinent for other types of systems. They suggest that comparative research, both across
organizations and across jurisdictions, is needed to assess rigorously the inﬂuence of
political relationships on the willingness of groups to turn to the courts across different
types of political systems.
Sociolegal scholars who have looked beyond the Anglo-American world have argued
that the broader institutional contexts that formalize political relationships between the
state and civil society groups might inﬂuence the likelihood of turning to the court in a
more hegemonic way. In contrast to pluralist systems like the United States and the
United Kingdom, where civil society groups are seen to be free to use their resources to
exert inﬂuence in the policy process, corporatist systems in Europe contain a few select
interest groups that are often formally incorporated into the governance process.
Schmitter ð1974, 93Þ proposed that “corporatism can be deﬁned as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of
singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differ-
entiated categories, recognised or licensed ðif not createdÞ by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and
supports.” Soennecken ð2013Þ argues that policy areas dominated by a neo-corporatist
logic, where groups are formally included in the formulation and implementation of
policy, may be less likely to see mobilization of the law through the courts by collective
actors. She suggests that “½neo-corporatism creates such a powerful system of accom-
modation, collaboration and compromise, it may make litigation by groups ðin whatever
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formÞ to resolve conﬂicts or to push agenda items not simply unlikely but ‘superﬂuous
and inappropriate.’ . . . In contrast, pluralist societies, such as the United States, are
considered much more ‘litigation prone’ because there, groups have not been offered
such a ‘social partnership’ and must continuously compete for the state’s attention to
realize political goals, often in an adversarial fashion” ð44Þ.
In sum, on the basis of existing theory about state–civil society relationships in neo-
corporatist settings, we would expect groups that are incorporated in policy making to be
less likely to turn to the courts than other groups. A case study of the French environ-
mental movements allows us to explore this proposition.
THE FRENCH CASE
Szarka ð2000, 89Þ writes, “In France, neo-corporatism has characterised and shaped core
components of environmental policy.” An extensive body of critical research documents
the institutionalization of the French environmental movement within the formal
political system, particularly since the establishment of the Ministry of the Environment
in 1971. Fillieule ð2003, 16Þ traces this neo-corporatist relationship back to the “slow and
difﬁcult birth of the administration of the Ministry for the Environment.” The ministry
received neither the administrative and ﬁnancial means nor the political legitimacy to
require other ministries to act. In the early 1970s, the ministry relied on environmental
groups as allies in political conﬂicts against other ministries ðagriculture, industry,
economics and ﬁnanceÞ as well as industrialists and locally elected ofﬁcials. In turn,
certain environmental groups were granted special access to policy consultations and
public subsidies to help fund their work ðFourcade 2011Þ. According to Élisabeth Joly-
Sibuet and Pierre Lascoumes, “It is possible to talk of exchange of service between the
state apparatus and the associations. In effect, on the one side associations were given
ofﬁcial recognition and institutional legitimacy sustained by the granting of the right to
take collective legal action, legal and ﬁnancial support. On the other, they were expected
to provide assistance to the democratic process” ðcited in Fillieule 2003, 74Þ.
This dynamic also plays out on the local level. Hayes ð2002Þ shows that in France the
decentralization of a formerly centralized state created even more opportunities for
environmentalists to develop partnerships with state authorities. Fillieule concludes from
this that “the relative paciﬁcation of the environmental movement can then be related to
its co-optation by the state” ð2003, 11Þ.
This neo-corporatist arrangement between state authorities and environmental groups
was formalized through the procedure known as the agrément, originally introduced in
the Environmental Protection Law of 1976. The purpose of this procedure is to select
certain associations ðassociations agréeesÞ that are then granted special access to the state’s
policy-making procedures. The range of privileges associated with the agrément was
expanded in 1995 by what is known as the Barnier Act ðlaw no. 95-101 of February 2,
1995; named after the then–minister of the environment, Michel BarnierÞ on the re-
inforcement of the protection of the environment. The organizations chosen for this
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special recognition by the state had to meet several criteria regarding how representative
they were, whether their functioning was compliant with legal regulations, whether their
ﬁnancial situation was in order, and whether their activities lay in the broader interest
and in the interest of the environment. The privileges conveyed by the agrément as
established by the 1976 Environmental Protection Act and the Barnier Act include, for
example, access to policy issue networks, automatic right to participate in a wide range
of national consultative bodies, and representation on regional and local committees.
The agrément also leads to the allocation of public subsidies ðSzarka 2002Þ.
France’s environmental movement is composed of a rich and varied mix of individual
activists, grassroots groups, and professional organizations.1 In the 1960s, associations
emerged to protect nature and oppose developments such as ski resorts, transport proj-
ects, and urban and coastal developments ðFillieule 2003Þ. In the 1970s, French branches
of transnational environmental associations were founded as part of a new wave of
environmentalism. Today, the leading associations includeWorldWide Fund for Nature
ðWWF FranceÞ, Greenpeace France, FNE, and LPO ðLequenne 1997; Szarka 2002;
McCauley 2007; Lebel and Desforges 2009; Nicolino 2011Þ.
Two of these groups were founded in the 1970s. WWF France was founded in 1973
and Greenpeace France was founded in 1977. Both of these organizations are linked to
transnational organizations but have predominantly had domestic policy issues as their
primary focus. FNE and LPO are homegrown French organizations with long histories,
and their federated governance structures mean that they are each connected to about
3,000 groups operating at the regional and local levels ðMcCauley 2007Þ. FNE was
founded in 1854 and was previously known as the Federation Française des Societies de
Protection de la Nature. LPO, founded in 1912, is devoted to the protection of birds
and their habitats and has been a part of the worldwide organization Birdlife Interna-
tional since 1993.
Exploring the approach to legal mobilization taken by these four organizations allows
us to understand the conditions under which groups may be more or less likely to
mobilize the law in France. Rather than being seen as representative of all environmental
NGOs in France, these groups should be understood as peak organizations. If they
cannot litigate for particular reasons relating to that peak status ðmore ﬁnances, greater
voice in policy making, etc.Þ, then that can help us glean some generalizable lessons.
The data for this research were gathered from several sources. First, the Conseil
d’Etat’s database of legal decisions was used to determine organizational participation
before the Conseil d’Etat, and an original data set of approximately 200 cases was com-
1. This article focuses on NGOs and hence limits the analysis to some of the key professionalized
organizations within the movement. For a rich literature on the French grassroots environmental
movement and local organizations, see, e.g., Fillieule ð2003Þ, Hayes ð2006Þ, and Hayes and Ollitrault
ð2012Þ.
108 | JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS | SPR ING 2016
piled. Second, the qualitative research relied on documentary evidence from NGOs
ðincluding annual reports, strategic plans, and press releasesÞ, literature on French social
movement organizations and environmental policy, and media reports of key develop-
ments. Third, semistructured interviews between December 2011 and June 2012 with
15 individuals including lawyers, legal scholars, policy ofﬁcers, and campaigners who
worked in or with the NGOs examined here helped to inform this research. Interviews
lasted from 1 to 3 hours, and interview quotes are fully anonymized because of the small
number of individuals involved in this ﬁeld. Interview quotes have been translated from
French by the author.
THE PUZZLE: LEGAL MOBILIZATION BY ENGOs
This section presents the overall record of legal mobilization before the Conseil d’Etat of
the environmental groups examined here.2 The Conseil d’Etat is France’s supreme
administrative court; it has the power to review the decisions of government and is
accessible to individual and collective actors. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the
number of cases taken by each group to the Conseil d’Etat.3 Overall, between 1975 and
2010 the ENGOs examined here appeared before the Conseil d’Etat 214 times.4 WWF
took four cases, Greenpeace appeared 14 times before the Conseil d’Etat, and LPO and
FNE were the most active, appearing 87 and 109 times, respectively.
The administrative decisions being challenged in the Conseil d’Etat by these groups
have been made by a wide range of governmental authorities: they range from local
authorities to the Ministry for Agriculture to the Finance Ministry to the governmental
authorities responsible for France’s overseas departments and territories. However, the
large majority of appearances these groups made before the Conseil d’Etat ð85%Þ
concerned a challenge to a decision that the Ministry of the Environment was responsible
2. It is worth noting here that in regard to breaches of environmental law, the judicial framework
in France allows for three different routes by which citizens and groups can mobilize the law. First,
before the civil court, any person with a legitimate interest can submit a claim to compensation for
damage caused by a breach of environmental law. The claimant must demonstrate that she suffered
harm, that the defendant committed a fault, and that there is a causal link between the fault and the
harm. Second, in terms of the public interest, the public prosecutor may launch criminal proceedings
on the initiative of any person who suffers damage because of an infraction of legislation. Third,
litigation related to administrative authorities is the jurisdiction of the administrative judge. This is the
route chosen by citizens and groups wanting to challenge the validity of an administrative decision. It
is cases brought before administrative authorities that are the focus here.
3. This means that some legal cases are counted twice or even three times. For example, in one case
regarding the authorization to make changes at a nuclear energy facility heard by the Conseil d’Etat,
both Greenpeace and FNE appeared as litigants putting forward similar arguments. Similarly, many of
the cases concerning bird hunting were litigated by both LPO and FNE. This includes cases in which
an NGO participated as either a litigant or an intervenor. This focus on the perspective of the groups
rather than on the overall number of cases is justiﬁed here because the phenomenon under scrutiny is
the bottom-up focus on the groups’ activity in the courts rather than a top-level perspective of the total
volume of cases the court hears.
4. This includes cases decided by the Conseil d’Etat from January 1975 to December 2010.
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for or was involved in.5 This is signiﬁcant: it is precisely the authority that has the power
to grant these groups access to policy-making processes and public subsidies that has been
the most challenged in the Conseil d’Etat.
Of course, counting cases in this way is a relatively crude measure of an NGO’s
willingness to use strategic litigation. Some cases can be relatively routine and decided
quickly and may not cost very much. Others require a much more substantial investment
of time and money. The signiﬁcance of these cases varies enormously as well.6 However,
because this research examines cases that have reached the highest administrative juris-
diction in France, it is safe to assume that each case, however routine, is of at least some
minimum level of importance in terms of environmental policy making and the power of
public authorities. The discussion below highlights some of the key trends and important
cases to illustrate how legal mobilization has mattered.
France Nature Environnement
FNE is the most litigious of the groups studied here both before the Conseil d’Etat for
the period covered here and more generally. For example, in 2013 the group litigated
5. The ministry responsible for the environment has existed in different guises since its creation.
For example, in the early years it was known as the Ministère de L’Environnement et du Cadre de Vie
ðthe Ministry of the Environment and the Living EnvironmentÞ; more recently it has been called the
Ministère de l’Écologie, de l’Énergie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer ðthe Ministry of Ecology,
Energy, Sustainable Development, and the SeaÞ. Much of the legislation challenged includes
interministerial legislation that involved the participation of several different ministries.
6. Some of the most important and high-proﬁle environmental cases in France, e.g., the Erika case,
which concerned a 1999 oil spill, have been adjudicated under criminal and civil law rather than
administrative law and hence are not included in this discussion.
Figure 1. Legal mobilization in the Conseil d’Etat by NGO, 1975–2010. Source: Com-
piled by the author from the Conseil d’Etat Jurisprudence Database. Additional informa-
tion on cases is available from the author.
110 | JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS | SPR ING 2016
155 cases across different jurisdictions: 70 before the administrative courts, 56 in the
criminal courts, and 29 in the civil courts. FNE’s caseload over the years has been ex-
tremely diverse, including more routine litigation and complex cases that have lasted years
and taken the group to the European Court of Justice ðECJÞ, which is the supranational
court system of the European Union.7 Of FNE cases before the Conseil d’Etat, 25%
concerned the regulation of the duration of the bird hunting season. Twenty percent
of FNE cases were challenges to decisions by the Ministry of the Environment and the
primeminister authorizing development and infrastructure projects. These included cases
opposing decisions to develop, for example, roads, tunnels, a technology park, and three
cases decided in 1992 challenging the creation of Euro-Disneyland. Just under 5% of
FNE cases before the Conseil d’Etat concerned challenges related to nuclear facilities and
radioactive waste storage.
Just over 5% of FNE cases concerned challenges to decisions permitting the devel-
opment of genetically modiﬁed ðGMÞmaize. These cases were taken in a broader context
of the politicization of GM products. The 1990s and 2000s witnessed high-proﬁle and
popular campaigns against GM food across Europe. In France, groups and individuals,
such as José Bové, who destroyed GM crops, used their criminal trials to raise their
concerns about genetically modiﬁed organisms ðGMOsÞ and received extensive coverage
in the media ðHayes 2006Þ. The Conseil d’Etat cases included several requests to refer the
issue to the ECJ for interpretation of Directive 2001/18 EC on the deliberate release into
the environment of GMOs. These decisions were handed down in 2008 and 2009 and
were part of a broader societal and political discourse about GMOs. The government
ultimately relied on the directive’s “safeguard” clause in September 2011 to enact a
suspension on the development of GMO corn in France.
Another highly politically charged area in which FNE has litigated concerns challenges
to local government’s decision making about what can be considered an “environmental
group” for the purpose of being a partner in policy making and policy implementation. In
the mid-1980s the group took a number of prefects to court for granting hunting groups
ofﬁcial status as civil society partners under environmental protection laws. The long-
standing animosity between hunting groups and nature conservation groups, and its
expression in legal activity, has cut right to the core of who is and is not an insider in
environmental policy making in France.
Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux
Seventy-seven percent of the cases taken by LPO challenge decisions of the Ministry
of the Environment on the hunting dates for certain species of birds each year. The fact
that this litigation is relatively routinized does not mean that it is not consequential.
7. The name of the court changed in 2009 to the Court of Justice of the European Union. For ease
the article will use the title European Court of Justice, which is what the court was called for the
majority of the period covered here.
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With France’s long history of high levels of contention between hunting groups and
conservationists, this litigation, in fact, had profound consequences in French society
and on the legal and political relationship between France and the European Union
ðSzarka 2000; Cichowski 2007Þ. In 1979 the Birds Directive ð79/409/EECÞ banned
the hunting of migratory birds during their reproductive season. The directive has been
ﬁercely resisted by hunters in France through mass demonstrations, political campaigns,
the establishment of a single-issue political party Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Tradition, and
general ﬂouting of the directive’s provisions ðSzarka 2000Þ. In the early 2000s, LPO
took a series of cases ðwith other organizations such as the Anti-hunting Union and
the Association for the Protection of Wild AnimalsÞ in which it requested the Conseil
d’Etat to make a referral to the ECJ for interpretation of the Birds Directive regarding
the period of the hunting season in several of its “routine” cases. In a signiﬁcant legal
victory for LPO, the ECJ found that the opening and closing dates of the hunting
season could not be decided by government authorities simply on the basis of the in-
terests of the hunters. In these cases LPO enlisted the ECJ ðvia a request to the Conseil
d’Etat for a referralÞ as a supranational ally against the decisions of the Ministry of the
Environment.
The remaining cases taken by LPO have concerned issues such as methods of hunt-
ing, challenges to habitat destruction, as well as disputes over major infrastructure proj-
ects. For example, in 1989, LPO contested the decision to build a bridge between the
Ile de Ré and the mainland, and in 2009 a delegation of LPO participated in a request
to annul the decision to develop the Notre-Dame-des-Landes Airport.
Greenpeace
While Greenpeace has taken a smaller number of cases than LPO and FNE, it has
nonetheless been involved in a number of high-proﬁle cases. Five of the 14 cases it has
taken before the Conseil d’Etat concerned nuclear facilities or the handling or control of
nuclear material or radioactive waste. Two cases concerned GMOs ðincluding a referral
to the ECJÞ, two cases concerned challenges to the development of the Mont Blanc
tunnel after a 1999 ﬁre, and two cases concerned the export of broken-down or asbestos-
ridden ships. One of these cases, over the export of Le Clemenceau, a decommissioned
aircraft carrier, to India, had a number of knock-on effects including protests in India over
the environmental justice concerns of shipping hazardous materials to the developing
world and a decision of the Supreme Court of India refusing permission to the ship to
enter its waters.
WWF France
WWF appeared before the Conseil d’Etat on only four occasions in the period examined
here. Three of these cases concerned challenges to infrastructure development including
water diversion schemes in the Saône and the Allier rivers and the building of a dam in
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Serre de la Fare. The environmental associations contesting the latter won their case, and
the project was abandoned.8
In summary, the variation in the quantity of cases is not driven simply by a number of
routine cases for those organizations that have turned to the courts more often. All of
these groups, except for WWF France, have taken cases to the ECJ via references by the
Conseil d’Etat. This alone is an enormously time-consuming and expensive endeavor that
challenges the very authority of the French government in the realm of environmental
policy making. This litigation activity thus presents an interesting puzzle in light of
existing theory on neo-corporatism and state–civil society relationships. Both FNE and
LPO have had a good degree of access to the French Ministry of the Environment, hold
important positions within policy networks, and are involved in program partnerships
ðSzarka 2000; McCauley 2007Þ. They have privileged positions in terms of access and
inﬂuence in policy making. And yet, counterintuitively, they are more present in the
courtroom than groups like Greenpeace, which explicitly reject partnering with govern-
ments and thus, according to existing theory, have less to fear in terms of jeopardizing
political relationships. The next section explores why this is the case.
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN LEGAL MOBILIZATION
This section lays out a series of hypotheses, derived from the literature on legal mobili-
zation, that account for why an NGO might or might not turn to the Conseil d’Etat.
It categorizes the hypotheses as lying at either the level of the opportunity structure or
the organizational level. The discussion highlights what evidence we should look for in
testing these explanations.
Legal Opportunity Structure
First, much of the recent literature on social movements and their interaction with law
and courts has deployed the notion of legal opportunity or legal opportunity structures
ðLOSÞ, to account for why some civil society groups embrace legal tactics and others
eschew them ðe.g., Hilson 2002; Andersen 2006; Vanhala 2012; Doherty and Hayes
2014Þ. The focus is on the institutional incentives and constraints that shape a group’s
ability to sue. There are disagreements as to what constitutes part of the LOS and what
does not ðsee Vanhala 2012, 527Þ, but at the eye of this scholarly storm there is a
consensus that the legal stock matters. Legal stock constrains the ways in which social
movement organizations can articulate their claims if they want to be successful in the
courtroom ðAndersen 2006Þ. This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis:
8. One small part of the reason for WWF’s quiescence may be the group’s involvement in a civil
case that lasted 9 years against a local hunting group in the Pyrenees Mountains for its role in the death
of Cannelle, the last survivor of the Pyrenean bear species, in 2004. Decided in 2013 by the Civil
Division of the High Court in Pau, the judge ordered the hunting organization to pay WWF €53,000
in damages.
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Hypothesis 1: Groups that operate in a policy ﬁeld with a larger body of rel-
evant and speciﬁc legal stock will be more likely to mobilize the law than groups
that operate in areas where law is less developed.
Scholars also agree that the regulations that limit or allow access to courts—the
standing rules that regulate who can bring cases—are crucial in determining whomobilizes
the law and who does not ðBörzel 2006;Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006; Evans Case
and Givens 2010Þ. This leads us to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Groups that operate in a policy ﬁeld where the standing rules are
more liberalized are more likely to mobilize the law than groups that operate in
areas where standing is more restricted.
If the LOS has mattered in the case of French ENGO mobilization of the law, we
can assess this using two types of evidence. The ﬁrst is information on the stock of avail-
able law—the amalgam of constitutional, statutory, administrative, common, and case
law—that these groups can rely on. The second concerns information about standing
rules—the regulations that determine who has the right to sue. In addition to these data,
there needs to be evidence to show that the groups are aware of the available legal stock
and standings rules ðCichowski 2007; Vanhala 2012Þ.
Organization-Level Attributes: Framing, Financial Resources, Legal Resources,
and Organizational Form
One of the critiques of opportunity structure approaches is that they cannot generally
account for variation across groups that operate within the same context ðVanhala
2011aÞ. As Edelman et al. ð2010, 661Þ argue, “organizational-level variables help explain
why tactical variation occurs between organizations in the same movement ﬁeld—even
when those organizations experience the same institutional pressures.”This article focuses
on four different types of organization-level factors: framing processes, ﬁnancial resources,
legal resources, and organizational structure or form.
For organizations to turn to law, they ﬁrst need to perceive their problems as ones that
can be addressed by the law. Scholarship on framing theory offers a useful analytic tool.
Frames have been deﬁned as schemata of interpretation. Snow et al. ð1986, 464, 466Þ
argue that “by rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize
experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. . . . What is at issue is
not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances
are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations.” Frames will
permeate all aspects of an organization, including its goals and its strategies in achieving
those goals. In terms of legal mobilization, scholars have argued that collective meaning
frames and their organizational implications can inﬂuence the likelihood that a group
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will participate in legal venues ðPedriana 2006; Vanhala 2009Þ. The way in which
groups frame law may inﬂuence their perceptions about the appropriateness of using
legal tools. This leads to a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Groups that frame the problems they seek to address through a
legal lens will be more likely to rely on legal tools, including litigation. Groups
that are skeptical of law or perceive it as serving only elite interests will be less
likely to litigate.
Evidence about organizational framings of law can be found in groups’ public doc-
uments and in the private statements of organizational insiders. If framing matters, then
groups that see a strong legal framework as an important part of addressing environmental
problems will be the ones more likely to turn to the courts. The evidence will allow for an
examination of how lawyers have understood and acted on their organization’s concep-
tion of the law and what the environmental legal framework offers. It is important to
distinguish between an “organization’s conception of law” on the one hand and attitudes
within an organization toward litigation on the other. The former might include a pos-
itive disposition to the existence of a strong legal framework, which might manifest as
a commitment to lobbying for legislation but may not extend to support for the use of
litigation by the group itself.
Scholarship has consistently shown that over time and across jurisdictions, the level of
ﬁnancial resources civil society groups possess inﬂuences the likelihood a group will turn
to law. Galanter ð1974Þ in his landmark study of litigation by “repeat players” found that
the “haves” tend to come out ahead. However, beyond the purely ﬁnancial, scholars have
also pointed to the role of other “resources,” such as in-house lawyers, that may help to
explain a group’s propensity to litigate ðMcCann 1994; Silverstein 1996; Kostiner 2003;
Edelman et al. 2010; Lejeune 2011; Barnes and Burke 2012; Vanhala 2012Þ. Epp ð1998,
17Þ found that across policy areas and across countries, “Combining rights consciousness
with a bill of rights and a willing and able judiciary improves the outlook for a rights
revolution, but material support for sustained pursuit of rights cases is still crucial.” Epp
argues that a “support structure”—consisting of organizations committed to establishing
rights, lawyers, and access to money—is a necessary condition for a rights revolution.
Another comparative study by Börzel ð2006Þ found that environmental groups in Spain
and Germany with strong organizational and ﬁnancial resources stand a better chance of
successfully exploiting legal opportunities than groups with weak resources. In order to
begin to disaggregate ﬁnancial and legal resources, this is broken down into two
additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Groups with greater access to ﬁnancial resources will be more
likely to mobilize the law than groups with less ﬁnancial resources.
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Hypothesis 5: Groups that possess greater legal resources will be more likely to
mobilize the law than groups that have less legal resources.
If “resources” matter in explaining which groups have turned to the courts in France,
we should be able to assess this using several types of evidence. The ﬁrst is the ﬁnancial
resources of groups and the second is the existence of lawyers within an organization and
the duration over which a group has had an in-house lawyer. If resources matter, then
those groups with signiﬁcant ﬁnancial resources and with in-house lawyers should be the
ones appearing more often before the Conseil d’Etat than groups with less access to
ﬁnancial and legal resources.
Finally, another group-level factor that may matter is the organizational structure of
a group. In social movement studies, scholars have found that the form a group takes
may inﬂuence the tactics it uses to mobilize ðOlson 1965; Alter and Vargas 2000Þ.
Existing theory would suggest that centralized groups with narrow mandates are better
able to navigate the legal sphere whereas decentralized groups with broad constitu-
encies will be subject, it is theorized, to the “Olsonian logic of collective action” and
hence less able to mobilize ðAlter and Vargas 2000, 474Þ. This leads to the ﬁnal
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Groups that are more centralized will be more likely to
mobilize the law than decentralized groups.
To explore if organizational structure mattered in groups’decisions tomobilize the law,
we can look at the organizational structure of each group and trace the inﬂuence this may
or may not have on the willingness and ability of groups’ leaders to mobilize in the
Conseil d’Etat.
EVIDENCE
This section uses the hypotheses developed above to explore the empirical evidence in the
French case. This qualitative research helps tease out an explanation for why incorporated
groups make the most active litigants.
Legal Stock
The evidence lends partial support to the hypothesis that groups that operate in a policy
ﬁeld with a larger body of relevant and speciﬁc legal stock will be more likely to mobilize
than groups that operate in areas where law is less developed. Morand-Deviller ð2010Þ
notes that, in France, the discipline of environmental law had its origins in administrative
law but that over the last three decades, environmental matters have grown in importance
in other areas such as civil and criminal law. Without surveying the full range of
environmental protections and policy instruments ðsee Lascoumes 2007; Halpern
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2011Þ, this section highlights some key markers over time in the development of en-
vironmental protection laws.
The earliest broad-ranging protections for nature were introduced in French law in
the law of July 10, 1976 ðno. 76-629Þ. Along with a host of other provisions, this law
established the environmental impact assessment procedures that consider the risks and
consequences of development projects on the environment. These procedures were
further developed at the European level and were strengthened by the transposition of
relevant directives through the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, the Birds Directive ð79/
409/EEC; 1979Þ and the Habitats Directive ð92/43/EEC; 1992Þ have been noted as
playing an important role in creating legal rights and prompting environmental groups to
turn to national courts to enforce EU law ðBraud 2002; Cichowski 2007; Berny 2011Þ.
The substantive content of these two directives also helps to explain the variation we see
in the French case. The focus on birds and habitats privileges groups that include the
protection of species and conservation such as LPO and FNE in terms of their ability to
mobilize the law. One NGO lawyer noted the extent to which they rely on EU envi-
ronmental law:
Often, I think that in at least half of our cases we note that something does not
respect European Community law. So in 2011 we undertook a case on environ-
mental impact assessments. We said in that case “this does not respect the
½European directives of 1995.”Three days ago I launched a case on environmental
evaluations ½impact analyses and the same thing: the European law argument
comes into it. We really have mastered European environmental law because we
know very well that everything ﬂows from that, and often even at the national level
there are decisions where we immediately go and check “does this respect Euro-
pean Community law?” ðInterview, June 13, 2012Þ
The evidence here supports hypothesis 1 that groups that operate within an area
with a larger body of legal stock will be more likely to mobilize the law. Much existing
sociolegal research and critical legal scholarship questions whether the existence of law is
enough to mobilize groups. Certainly, the adoption of new protections in the late 1970s
played some role in encouraging groups to turn to the courts as there is no evidence of
similar types of cases before the 1976 protections came into effect. However, none of the
major pieces of environmental law examined here have “opened the ﬂoodgates” in terms
of legal mobilization by environmental associations. Certainly some pieces of legislation,
for example, the EU Birds and Habitats Directives, have been identiﬁed as being par-
ticularly useful for organizations that take cases in those policy areas. This can at least
partially explain the variation we see in the French case; but the quiescence of WWF
France, which is also concerned with conservation and species protection, is notable.
There are a number of cases in which WWF France could have become involved in birds
protection or habitat protection but did not. The data here suggest that law alone is not
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enough to account for legal mobilization activity, nor can it fully explain the variation
across groups.
The Neo-corporatization of Standing
The evidence complicates the picture presented in hypothesis 2, which suggests that
groups that operate in a policy ﬁeld in which standing rules are more liberalized are more
likely to mobilize the law. In fact, the design of standing rules since 1995 has meant that
not all groups are treated in a similar fashion in terms of access to justice. There has been
a neo-corporatization of the right of NGOs to sue.
French courts in general—administrative, civil, and criminal—have long taken a broad
view of NGO standing. This does not help us explain the variation we see among the
groups here as it would apply to all of them. However, since the adoption of the 1976
environmental protection laws and the Barnier Act in 1995, the legal opportunity struc-
ture has in fact begun to differentiate among environmental interest groups. The feature
of the agrément ðdiscussed aboveÞ that is particularly relevant for this case study concerns
the extension of neo-corporatist governance to the legal standing of these groups. Be-
yond just privileged access to political decision making, these groups are also granted
special status when it comes to accessing justice.9
Before the adoption of the Barnier Act, standing decisions depended on two factors.
The ﬁrst was whether the legal action related to an association’s area of interest. The act
contested by the association had to be based on legislation that had a direct link with the
organization’s ﬁeld of activities ðRass-Masson 2006, 20Þ. This proved to limit some
organizations’ ability to take cases. LPO—which until recently had had a narrowmandate
focused on birds—was, for example, excluded from taking certain cases relating to
habitats because of strict judicial interpretations of the association’s mandate.
The second factor was the geographical dimension to locus standi. France is a
decentralized state represented at the central level by the government and at the regional
and departmental levels by prefects. Regions, departments, and municipalities have
jurisdiction over local issues and are also delegated certain responsibilities by the state.
The contested act had to correspond to the geographical area of action ðproximité
géographiqueÞ mentioned in the statutes of the association that makes the appeal
ðRass-Masson 2006, 20Þ. This changed with the adoption of the Barnier Act: groups
that are recognized under the agrément no longer have to show their geographic
9. There have been attempts to narrow the access NGOs have to the legal system. In 1999 a law
was proposed that sought to limit what some legislators perceived as “abusive recourse against public
authorities” ðRass-Masson 2006, 25Þ. A 2011 reform of the agrément procedure did effectively cut
the number of groups. In 2010, there were almost 2,000 associations with this status operating in the
realm of urban and environmental issues ðMorand-Deviller 2010Þ; but after a 2011 reform to the
process, the number of environmental associations with the designation has dropped dramatically to
approximately 150 ðinterview, June 14, 2012Þ. At the national level, the number dropped from almost
110 at the end of 2012 to a dozen at the beginning of 2013.
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proximity to the issue as long as it is in their ﬁeld of action. Some lower administrative
authorities showed reluctance to implement this in the immediate period after the
adoption of the law, but the Conseil d’Etat upheld this requirement in 1999 ðCE
8 février 1999, Fédération des Associations de Protection de l’Environnement de la Na-
ture des Côtes d’Armor, no. 66, p. 6Þ.
Associations agréees, in addition to their extensive privileges in policy-making processes,
now beneﬁt from being able to act in a legal capacity as defenders of the public interest in
areas of environmental protection. They can act as a plaintiff in instances in which there
has been direct or indirect harm to collective interests and a violation of any environ-
mental law that these recognized groups have the objective of defending. A unique feature
of French environmental law is the fusing of civil and criminal processes whereby if a
criminal case is being prosecuted an association agréee can join the case as a plaintiff
ðPapadopoulou 2009Þ. NGO lawyers pointed out that the agrément saves time and re-
sources in terms of not having to make the case for an organization’s interest each time it
appears before the tribunal:
This article has the object of giving administrative recognition to the ability of
associations to seize judicial processes. . . .What this means is that when you want
to take environmental litigation and you have this administrative recognition, your
right to act in the case is presumed. You don’t have to spend hours showing why
you should be allowed to take a case. It really facilitates access to judges. ðInterview,
June 14, 2012Þ
On criminal actions, it’s true that we have to emphasize that in France we are much
luckier than other European countries because we, the associations, have relatively
easy access to the judge. Normally in law you have to show that you suffered a
harm, a direct and personal harm, which is very restraining. But in France for
associations, especially environmental protection associations but also consumer
associations, for years and years we have been able to just say that every environ-
mental infraction, if we are an environmental protection organization, causes us
indirect harm. And that gives us very, very wide access to the judge . . . but we
know we are lucky compared to other countries. . . . This wide access we’ve had
it since 1995 in my opinion. ðInterview, June 13, 2012Þ
Another lawyer was somewhat more cynical about the reasoning behind the wide
access granted to NGOs:
The idea is a bit funny: give power toNGOs tomake authorities respect legal texts.
That’s to say that if I am a political authority, if I’m the government, and I don’t
respect a European directive . . . but if I give the power to associations to make
political authorities respect the texts, in the ﬁnal calculation it is the judge who
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holds the government to account. . . . Take for example local politicians, with a
category of the population like hunters, or those working in agriculture, or
developers; they can say “it’s not my fault, it’s the fault of associations, it’s the
judges’ fault.” In some ways it is a system that is a little hypocritical, or ambiguous,
or very sophisticated. ðInterview, December 2, 2011Þ
The evidence here requires a reconsideration of hypothesis 2, which stated that groups
that operate in a policy ﬁeld in which standing rules are liberalized are more likely to
mobilize the law. This hypothesis was deduced from previous research that has assumed
that the standing rules in a particular policy area will be uniform. That is, all groups will
face the same institutional incentives and constraints. In the French case, the neo-
corporatization of standing rules has meant that groups are treated differently in terms
of access to justice. As discussed above, existing theory would lead us to expect that neo-
corporatist policy relationships would dampen an organization’s interest in pursuing law
because of a fear of jeopardizing the access granted in political processes. However, the
French case shows that the neo-corporatist arrangement may in fact promote legal
mobilization by certain groups if that neo-corporatist logic is extended to the governance
of standing rules. In France, the institutionalization of the right to take collective legal
action as part of the agrément has not only granted certain groups special access to the
courts but may also have played a role in raising awareness of the use of administrative
courts as a part of a group’s normal activities.
Framing
Hypothesis 3 suggests that a group’s framing processes will inﬂuence the likelihood that it
will use litigation: if a group views the problems it seeks to address as legal ones, we would
expect it to be more likely to turn to the courts than groups that might be skeptical about
law. There is some support for this when looking at the French case, but it is not clear-cut:
FNE is particularly interested in improving and deploying the environmental legal
framework compared to the other groups. Greenpeace is somewhat skeptical about what
the law can offer, which helps to explain its relatively low levels of litigation. The evidence
on the other two groups is less clear-cut in terms of how their framing processes inﬂuence
the turn to law. This section discusses each group brieﬂy in turn.
FNE has been a keen proponent of the legal framework, and much of its work is
focused on developing legal texts that can be used to achieve better environmental
outcomes. One lawyer that had worked with FNE describes the organization’s general
approach to the law: “At FNEwe use criminal law and we use civil law; we really use legal
tools, much more than other associations in fact. It’s true that it really is our specialty. . . .
We’re pretty known for that. For taking litigation in cases where there isn’t another
association that is acting for example. And our speciﬁc approach is that we take legal
action on lots of subjects” ðinterview, June 13, 2012Þ. Another lawyer who had worked
closely with FNE articulated what he saw as the organization’s primary role:
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What is our role? In fact, we are a challenge to established authority, so it’s
simply that we are interested in the effectiveness of legal texts. So there are entire
parts of law that would never have been implemented, that would never have
led to jurisprudence if it wasn’t for the use of law by associations. . . . So, if you
look at it from a political angle, the subtlety of the French system, that is also
very ambiguous, that’s to say there are many, many legal texts but there are
relatively few that function. At the same time, we put into the hands of as-
sociations the power to seize the courts to make those texts work. ðInterview,
December 2, 2011Þ
LPO’s attitude toward using law has changed in the last few years, though generally it
has also been relatively favorable of a robust legal framework at both the national and
supranational levels. LPO also offers an example of how a change in the framing of an
organization’s mission vis-à-vis the law can increase the likelihood of turning to the courts.
In 2012 the organization expanded its ofﬁcial areas of interest to ensure that it would be
able to act in legal cases that it felt were of direct relation to its mission, but which
tribunals had interpreted in a restrictive way to limit their standing: “So we have cases
that are brought to us that are broader than the theme of birds. So we realized that the
fact that we are no longer just about birds posed a problem in terms of litigation. . . . So
in one case the tribunals interpreted our statutes in a very strict way. ½By broadening
our mandate to include environmental protection we are now more free to work on
the broad range of subjects that interest us and are about birds in a broader sense”
ðinterview, June 18, 2012Þ.
Greenpeace as an organization has an alternative framing of what the law is and what
it can achieve. While appearing in a relatively small number of cases before the Conseil
d’Etat, the group does nonetheless engage with the law. However, it differs from the other
organizations discussed here in that it is often engaged in criminal law after nonviolent
direct action protests. Greenpeace’s reluctance to use the law has been attributed by
several research participants to the culture of action within the organization and the time
scales of justice. For example, one participant noted about Greenpeace that “there is a
mistrust of judges. In general the justice of men is too slow: it’s not adapted to the cli-
mate emergency, to the ecological emergency etc. But like I said that is changing. I’m
ﬁghting a lot—not against them but with them—to try to convince the organization to
use more proactive law” ðinterview, June 14, 2012Þ.
The evidence about the inﬂuence of framing processes at WWF is a little more
ambiguous. WWF has been understood both internally and externally as an organization
that does not use litigation in France. Said one participant from the organization, “WWF
is not an organization that wants to undertake a lot of litigation. For at least the last
10 years the object has been to undertake nature protection programs” ðinterview, June 7,
2012Þ. According to a participant from outside the group, the organization at one point
considered increasing its use of proactive litigation and then changed course for reasons
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related to the ﬁscal nature of the organization. In 2004 it became a foundation rather than
an association under French law:
So, WWF recently, in about 2003 . . . asked themselves “would it not be in our
interest to use the law proactively?” So they began to do it slowly, and now I can say
they have stopped completely. This policy of using law was stopped almost as soon
as it had started. . . . It’s not their culture in fact. . . . In French law there are two
types of organizations: associations and foundations. And they went to see a lawyer
that was specialized in ﬁscal law who told them “ﬁnancially it would be better if
you were a foundation.” Except the only problem is that foundations don’t have
the automatic right to participate in legal processes; that’s reserved for associations.
So they lost, without necessarily wanting to, the ability to appear before tribunals.
ðInterview, June 14, 2012Þ
While WWF might be supportive of a robust legal framework for nature protection, this has
not led to a focus on the use of legal tools.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is possible to draw some links between groups that frame
law as an effective tool for environmental protection and a greater propensity to litigate,
on the one hand, and more limited action by those groups that are more skeptical of the
law, on the other. This reticence has stemmed either from the fact that law and litigation
jars with their general approach to achieving social change ðas in the case of GreenpeaceÞ
or because the group privileges other modes of action ðsuch as WWFÞ.
Financial Resources
The evidence in the French case completely counters the predictions of hypothesis 4 that
“groups with greater access to ﬁnancial resources will be more likely to mobilize the law
than groups with less ﬁnancial resources.”Table 1 shows the amount each group spent on
its campaigns in 2000/2001 and 2006. Table 2 shows variation in ﬁnancial income
ranging from €3 million for FNE to €16 million for WWF for 2010. By all of these
measures the ﬁndings run counter to our theoretical expectation. The wealthiest group,
WWF, is the least litigious in the Conseil d’Etat, whereas the least wealthy group, FNE, is
the most litigious. This suggests that other factors matter more than ﬁnances in explain-
ing the variation in legal mobilization in this case. It is worth bearing in mind, however,
that these groups are generally the largest and wealthiest NGOs in France ðSzarka 2002;
McCauley 2007; Nicolino 2011Þ, and so the ﬁndings may not be generalizable to the
whole population of environmental groups in France.
Legal Resources
This research ﬁnds limited support for hypothesis 5, which suggests that groups that
possess greater legal resources will be more likely to mobilize the law. One limitation here
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is that the measures for assessing a group’s framing of law on the one hand and the
measures to assess its legal resources on the other tend not to be mutually exclusive in the
organizational setting. For example, the existence of a large legal team may signal a gen-
erally positive disposition toward using the law in achieving an organization’s goals, but
this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, the presence of lawyers within an organiza-
tion might lead to an increased likelihood of framing problems through a legal lens, but
there is no consensus in the literature that this is necessarily true ðEdelman et al. 2010;
Vanhala 2012Þ. This discussion focuses on the presence and role of lawyers whereas
the discussion of framing above focused on their interpretations of their organizations’
orientation toward law. Together these allow us to begin to assess when and why an or-
ganization may become a part of a broader “support structure” ðEpp 1998Þ.
FNE has had a legal network of in-house lawyers and volunteers since 1995. At the
time of writing, in addition to two in-house lawyers at the national organization, there are
also a number of lawyers within local organizations with whom they regularly collaborate:
“We have lawyers that work with our local associations. So I think there are about
18 lawyers employed. So for us, as we work at the national level, we often help local asso-
ciations that don’t have a lawyer. When they do have a lawyer we work with the lawyers:
we help train them so that after they can help their associations. It’s really a pyramid
system” ðinterview, June 13, 2012Þ. The organization also had a network of about
70 lawyers who work on a pro bono basis for the group. Looking at both the attitudes
toward law in the organization and the commitment of resources to hiring in-house
Table 1. NGO Campaign Spending: 2000/2001 and 2006
Total Spending on Campaigns
Organization 2000 2006
WWF France €7,000,000 €5,787,234
Greenpeace France €1,574,000* €3,642,000
LPO €1,873,684 €2,036,111
FNE €74,226 €66,250
Source.—Compiled by the author from McCauley ð2007Þ and from Greenpeace Rapport
D’Activités, 2001, and Rapport Général du Commissaire aux Comptes, 2007.
* Data for Greenpeace for the year 2000 were not available, so the ﬁgure here is from 2001.








Source.—Compiled by the author from the ﬁnancial accounts of each NGO.
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lawyers and developing an extensive legal network, it is clear that FNE has developed a
pro-law culture, and this has shaped the use of legal tactics.
LPO has employed a lawyer since 1990 and currently has two lawyers working in-
house. One participant noted, “We have always had a vocation to undertake litigation,
and we used to put a lot in the hands of outside lawyers, but not always, and not always
successfully. . . . But we didn’t necessarily always have the time to ﬁnd them. . . . It became
obvious that we would need to be able to manage a certain number of cases ourselves”
ðinterview, June 18, 2012Þ. Another participant noted that the recent broadening of
LPO’s mission could also inﬂuence the group’s litigation activity:
When the association started, it was really about the protection of birds. Now, we
have two lawyers in the association. One has been here for 20 years and really
works on litigation on birds, hunting, and protected species. And little by little in
fact we began litigation on habitats. . . . And just recently we changed the statutes
of the association, so now we are an association that does nature protection. So we
will stay focused on birds, but in terms of litigation we can work on everything.
So if we want we could work on waste, on water. These are legal actions that we
haven’t done yet, or only a few in any case. ðInterview, June 18, 2012Þ
Lawyers became involved in Greenpeace in a more institutionalized manner after the
1985 bombing by the French authorities of the Rainbow Warrior, one of Greenpeace’s
ships that was protesting against the country’s nuclear testing in French Polynesia
ðinterview, June 14, 2012Þ. According to one lawyer who has worked with the group,
proactive litigation began to be considered more seriously by the organization around
1995: “So they took a proactive case which led to jurisprudence. The group attacked
Jacques Chirac’s decision to restart nuclear tests in the Paciﬁc. The case was destined to
fail, that’s clear, but it was a proactive approach. That was, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst
or one of the ﬁrst proactive legal cases. . . .Now they accept the idea but . . .” ðinterview,
June 14, 2012Þ. Greenpeace did increase the number of cases it was involved in after this
period. However, the range of cases it has taken to the Conseil d’Etat on a proactive basis
has been relatively limited in terms of policy area ðcompared to their sphere of action
overallÞ. A lawyer from another NGO also attributed Greenpeace’s limited number of
legal actions to a lack of resources: “I think that the number of legal actions by Green-
peace are relatively limited in France in fact. Well, they are more well known, they do big
protests, but in the legal arena and even in lobbying. . . . I think they have fewer human
resources and fewer lawyers and so they work less in that domain” ðinterview, June 13,
2012Þ.
The nature of in-house legal staff in the WWF is very different from that in FNE, for
example. The lawyer at WWF was employed in the early 2000s in the ﬁrst instance as
someone to take care of contracts and the legal structure of the organization. She began
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working at the time that the organization became interested in the potential for a
Constitutional Charter for the Environment and hence became involved in lobbying
and legal work related to the passage of the charter. However, in her interview she noted
that very little attention is devoted to proactive litigation: “Because we are a foundation,
and not an association, in law it is much less easy to undertake litigation. But that’s not
a problem because for WWF litigation was never part of its way of acting for nature. The
organization has always used nature protection programs and lobbying. And that’s why
we have had a few legal actions, because we can still litigate. But some organizations have
taken 100, 200, 300 cases. Us? Not at all, we’ve had four or ﬁve cases” ðinterview, June 7,
2012Þ.
In summary, this research ﬁnds no clear-cut evidence in terms of whether the pres-
ence of in-house lawyers means an organization is more likely to channel organizational
activity into legal avenues.
Organizational Structure
Finally, this research counters the expectations of hypothesis 6 that groups that are more
centralized will be more likely to mobilize the law. Instead, this research ﬁnds the exact
opposite: decentralized groups were more litigious in the Conseil d’Etat. Both FNE and
LPO, as mentioned above, are federated organizations with local and regional groups as
well as a national-level organization ðMcCauley 2007; Berny 2013Þ.
A decentralized organizational structure is advantageous in taking cases to the admin-
istrative tribunals for two reasons. First, before the adoption of the Barnier Act and the
inclusion of presumed standing for environmental associations, the geographic proximity
requirement to achieve standing meant that the contested issue and the geographic
operation of an organization had to overlap. This meant that a local organization could
contest only local decisions and a national-level organization could contest only decisions
that operated on the same geographic scale. Groups that are federated like FNE and LPO
were thus able to pursue legal challenges at all levels. This ﬂexibility contrasts signiﬁcantly
with groups like Greenpeace, which are small and concentrated at the national level and
hence have historically been disadvantaged in terms of access to the lower courts. The
second advantage of decentralized governance in terms of legal mobilization is that cases
are brought to the organizations’ attention from across the country in a bottom-up
manner, and decisions can be made as to which is the best case on which to litigate an
issue and which is the best forum in which to challenge a decision ðinterview, June 13,
2012Þ.
In short, decentralization, rather than creating a collective action problem as predicted
in existing theory, in fact multiplied opportunities to access justice. The interaction
between this agent-level characteristic in operation with the legal opportunity structure
helps to explain why FNE and LPO have been more likely to mobilize the law than
Greenpeace and WWF over time.
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CONCLUSION
This research makes two contributions to existing theory on legal mobilization. First, it
offers a nuanced illustration of when and why we might see policy “insiders” turn to the
courts under neo-corporatist governance. The regulations governing organizational access
to judges for environmental protection associations changed dramatically over the time
period documented here. The adoption of the Barnier Act in 1995, which grants quasi-
automatic standing for groups that are recognized by the administrative authorities
through the agrément, effectively neo-corporatized access to justice for ENGOs. This
has resulted in a paradox from the viewpoint of existing theory. Scholars who have stud-
ied litigation activity in neo-corporatist countries have argued that civil society–state
relationships in these contexts tend to have a dampening effect on civil society groups’
likelihood of turning to the courts ðMorag-Levine 2003; Soennecken 2013Þ. In France,
an opposite logic is in operation: insider groups that are formally recognized by admin-
istrative authorities and granted special access in decision making are also privileged in
terms of their ability to take collective legal action. While this article has focused on
administrative cases, this privileged position in terms of access to justice applies in the
ﬁeld of criminal law as well ðFourcade 2011Þ.
A second contribution this article makes concerns the challenge of accounting for
variation across groups that are situated within the same set of institutional constraints
and incentives. This research found that FNE and LPO were much more present before
the Conseil d’Etat, and interview data suggest that these groups are generally more
amenable to using legal tactics. This is best explained by the interaction between group-
level characteristics—such as organizational form and the way in which a group framed
the law—with the legal opportunity structure. The decentralized governance structures
of FNE and LPO facilitated historical access to the courts because of standing require-
ments related to geographic proximity and the ability of these organizations to identify
potential cases in a bottom-up manner. While lawyers played some role in promoting
litigation within these organizations, the inﬂuence of legal professionals in channeling
activity into legal spheres is not clear-cut.
One surprising result is that ﬁnancial resources did not seem to matter as much as
previous research has suggested. The fact that WWF, the wealthiest ENGO studied here,
litigates the least and that FNE, the least wealthy of these groups, litigates the most
suggests that while ﬁnances may be a necessary condition for the use of legal tactics, it is
not the driving force for the variation among these groups. This echoes the ﬁndings of
Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero ð2006, 327Þ, who suggested that “the resources necessary
to pursue the legal path effectively are thus contingent on the rules that guide access to
and the cost requirements of the court.” It also suggests that further research that
differentiates ﬁnancial resources from legal resources in terms of their explanatory power
is needed.
These ﬁndings shed new light on legal mobilization theory. For parsimonious expla-
nations, theory should be able to account for the turn to the courts both within and
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outside pluralist-style political systems. Thus far there has been a consensus that ðat least
in EuropeÞ the culture of civil society–state relationships is an important background
condition that shapes the ways in which groups might think about using the law. This
research ﬁnds that groups in neo-corporatist systems, where the authority to govern is
shared between state and civil society to some extent, not only may be interested in using
the law but may be encouraged to do so by the regulatory environment. This challenges
existing understandings of the role of neo-corporatist political culture’s impact on legal
mobilization and speaks to wider debates about the spread of adversarial legalism in
Europe ðKagan 1997, 2007; Kelemen 2011Þ.
These results, while based on a narrow case study, nonetheless raise a number of
important questions that scholars interested in legal mobilization might consider in
future research. First, how does the interaction of context and agent-level characteristics
shape legal mobilization propensities? Most research on legal mobilization has tended to
focus on one or several of the factors examined here, but rarely is the interaction between
variables explored in a systematic way. For example, the research presented here and in
previous work ðWilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006Þ has suggested that given the right
legal opportunity structure, ﬁnancial resources may not matter as much in mobilizing
the law in some jurisdictions as they have in the United States. If the rules on standing,
the cost rules, and the potential rewards of litigation align in the right way, it may
sometimes even be proﬁtable for groups to turn to the courts ðFarhang and Spencer
2014Þ.
A second question that arises from this work is, what are the mechanisms that shape
how legal resources matter? This research and much previous work by those with
expertise in organizational studies show that the impact of legal staff on an organization’s
propensity to litigate is not clear-cut. Furthermore, other variables such as legal con-
sciousness within the organization or access to a large network of pro bono lawyers in lieu
of in-house legal staff may also matter. Research that disaggregates the various features
of “legal resources” and examines the ways in which they might or might not shape the
turn to the courts would contribute to our understandings of why and when resources of
different types may matter.
Finally, there are interesting questions to be explored by students of NGOs at the
international level who focus on transnational networks and diffusion. On the one hand,
it would be reasonable to expect that a group that has a longer history as part of
an international network or organization, such as Greenpeace, might be more likely to
use law than “homegrown” domestic groups because of their exposure to the use of legal
tactics by sister organizations in other jurisdictions where litigation has been a normal
course of action. On the other hand, one might expect that internationally linked groups
are less interested than domestic groups in engaging with domestic law or transforming
the national legal opportunity structure. Future research might explore these dynamics in
more detail in order to offer an account of the extent and limits of diffusion of legal tactics
across and within transnational NGOs.
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